Group-based lending programs for the poor have become a focus of attention in the development community over the last several years. An important research question is whether program participation significantly changes household behavior and, because many of these programs target women, whether the gender of the program participant matters. If the gender of program participant matters, as this paper shows, credit may not be perfectly fungible within the household. To date, there has been no comprehensive investigation of the impact of these credit programs on household behavior that has been sufficiently attentive to issues of endogeneity and self-selection.
2
Very few studies have attempted to identify the causal effects of program participation. Previous studies that attempted to estimate program impact simply compared outcomes between participating and non-participating households. For example, a widely cited study similar in scope to ours which was carried out by the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies in the 1980's (BIDS 1990) did not address self-selection into the credit programs studied. To the extent that program participation is self-selective, it is not clear whether measured program effects reflect, in part, unobserved attributes of households (such as ability, health and preferences) that affect both the probability they will participate in the programs (and the extent of that participation) and the household outcomes (schooling of children, labor supply, asset accumulation) of interest. It is important not only to measure the impact of these credit programs on household welfare, but to determine whether targeting of credit toward women really matters. As Rashid and Townsend (1993) point out, the fungibility of credit within the household makes gender and other individual characteristics of borrowers potentially unimportant in loan usage and hence on the impact of loans on household outcomes such as those examined below. A finding that the gender of credit program participant matters in the determination of these outcomes is seemingly inconsistent with perfect fungibility. This paper estimates the impact of participation, by gender, in each of the three group-based credit programs on women's and men's labor supply, boy's and girls's schooling, expenditure and assets. We find that participation in these credit programs, as measured by quantity of cumulative borrowing, is a significant determinant of many of these outcomes. Furthermore, credit provided to women was more likely to influence these behaviors than credit provided to men. The method applied corrects for the potential bias arising from unobserved individual-, household-and village-level heterogeneity. The study uses a quasi-experimental survey design to provide statistical identification of program effects in a limited information maximum likelihood framework. The survey design covers one group of households which has the choice to enter a credit program and which may alter their behavior in response to the program, and a "control" group which is not given the choice of entering the program but whose behavior is still measured.
Similarly, the identification of these program's impact by the gender of the participant is accomplished based on the comparison between groups of each gender with and without the choice to participate.
Analyzing program impacts by comparing households in villages with programs and households in village without programs suffers from possibility that program placement is endogenous. These programs, whose professed goal is to better the lives of the poor, may have chosen villages in a conscious manner based on their wealth, attitudes or other attributes. We use a village-level fixed-effects method to circumvent the problem of village unobservables biasing our estimate of the impacts of these credit programs.
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The remaining portion of the paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly discusses the role of the group in these programs and the peculiar advantages they provide women. Section III presents the empirical framework and Section IV sets out the method of statistical identification using quasiexperimental aspects of the program and the special survey conducted in Bangladesh. Section V briefly describes the data. Section VI presents the results of estimating the reduced form determinants of program credit, and determinants of a set of household-and individual-level outcomes conditional on the quantity of program credit borrowed by gender. The last section summarizes the results.
II. Group-based Credit and the Gender of Participants
There are a number of reasons for group-based lending to be particularly attractive to women in rural Bangladesh and in other low income societies. Very few women work in the wage labor market in rural Bangladesh. It is a conservative Islamic society that encourages the seclusion of women (purdah).
Self-employment activities that produce goods at home for market sale are less frowned upon culturally.
Moreover, time in self-employment at home may jointly produce household goods such as child-care.
Although some of these production activities can be operated at low levels of capital intensity, for many a minimum level of capital is needed. This minimum is often the result of the indivisibility of capital items.
For example, dairy farming requires no less than one cow while hand-powered looms have a minimum size.
For other activities where the indivisibility of physical capital is not an issue, such as paddy husking, transactions costs and the high costs of information place a floor on the minimal level of operations. In many societies these indivisibilities may not be consequential, but household income and asset wealth among the rural poor of many developing countries, including Bangladesh, is so low that the cost of initiating production at minimal economic levels is quite high. At very-low levels of income and consumption, reducing current consumption to accumulate assets for this purpose may not be optimal because it may seriously threaten health (and production efficiency) and life expectancy, as shown in Gersovitz (1983) . The production inefficiency associated with the lack of a women's labor market generates an incentive for borrowing capital to undertake women's self-employment that does not exist for men.
Why group-based credit? Group lending schemes may have an informational advantage over outside lenders --obtaining information about the actions of each member of a group by an outside lender would be costly and subject to misrepresentation. Group members can monitor each other with relative ease as well as train and assist low productivity members. Social custom in rural Bangladesh restricts direct contact between potential female borrowers and (male) outside lenders. Even if the credit program organizer is male, it is easier for a woman to interact with the organizer when in the company of a larger group of women. The informational advantages of group-based credit are thus likely to be greater for women than men. This information advantage carries over to the issue of bundling credit and insurance.
In the absence of insurance, adverse shocks may have an effect on the ability to repay loans as well as lower effort in the financed project and decrease income and consumption. Here again, the group is likely to have an informational advantage over outside lenders. Moreover, there is evidence that women are more prone to adverse shocks, related to pregnancy, illnesses associated with childbearing, and caregiving for other household members who fall ill, making them riskier clients for poorly informed outside lenders (Rashid and Townsend, 1993) . The credit programs evaluated in this paper bundle insurance with the provision of credit, and rely on the information available to the group to administer this insurance.
The advantages of group-based credit for women described above are insufficient to generate an efficiency argument for targeting. In a model in which the household acts as if it is a single agent, husbands who are free to participate in the formal or informal credit market can borrow on behalf of their wives. In order for the incentives for borrowing capital to undertake women's self-employment result in women borrowers requires that either both spouses are credit constrained, or only the female is credit constrained and credit is not fungible within the household. If multiperson households cannot be treated as single decision makers --if household allocations are the result of a process of interaction between members with difference preferences (collective decision-making)--then fungibility of funds within the household may not hold. Models of collective decision-making as well as tests of their implications are now well represented in the literature, much of which is surveyed by Bergstrom (1995) . There is a substantial literature in which the reduced form demand for goods is related to some measure of the relative power or command over resources of one household member to another. Most of these empirical studies, many of which are surveyed in Strauss and Beegle (1994) and Bergstrom (1995) , draw the inference that multiperson households cannot be treated as single decision makers. Consequently, credit might not be fungible within the household.
In this paper, we suggest and implement a method that treats survey data on group-based credit program participation as if credit program participation were generated by an experiment, with access to group-based credit "randomly" allocated to one sex or another, and which controls for self-selection by these "randomly" chosen household members into the program. However, any finding of different relative effects for female and male credit program participation should not be taken as a test of a collective model
of household decision-making. Peer monitoring in these group-based schemes is sufficiently close that households may have to carryout the funded project using the borrowed funds and the participant's time input as described in the application to borrow, even if both time and funds would be allocated differently in the absence of monitoring. If both a (landless) husband and wife are credit constrained and only men have access to the wage labor market, then it may be optimal to borrow to fund a self-employment activity for the wife whether decision making is by a single decision maker or collective decision making. The funding of self-employment activities will alter the shadow value of women's time, and perhaps the shadow value of children's time as well, and alter the allocation of goods through the familiar income and substitution effects. Similarly, group-based funding of a credit constrained husband, with access to the labor market, whose ability to divert funds and effort is limited by the monitoring of the group, will likely have a very different impact on the shadow value of time and hence on substitution and income effects within the household in either a unitary or a collective model of decision making. The lack of fungibility of credit within the household may thus reflect close project monitoring and not necessarily a collective model of household decision making. Nonetheless, if self-selection and other sources of endogeneity are controlled for, any finding of differential effects of group-based credit on household outcomes by gender of program participant is not consistent with the fungibility of credit within the household.
III. Estimation Strategy
In this paper we estimate the conditional demands for a set of household behaviors, conditioned on the household's program participation as measured by the quantity of credit borrowed. The quantity of credit is, of course, only one measure of the flow of services associated with participation in any one of the group-based lending programs. As the introductory section has made clear, they are much more than just lending institutions. Nevertheless, the quantity of credit is the most obvious and well measured of the services provided.
Consider the reduced form equation (1) for the level of participation in one of the credit programs (C ), where level of participation will be taken to be the value of program credit that household i in village j ij borrows, where X is a vector of household characteristics (e.g. age and education of household head), Z is a set of ij ij household or village characteristics distinct from the X's in that they affect C but not other household
behaviors conditional on C (see below), $ , and B are unknown parameters, µ is an unmeasured The endogeneity of group-based credit may arise from:
1) Nonrandom placement of credit programs. It is unlikely that credit programs are allocated across the villages of Bangladesh in a random fashion. Indeed, program officials note that they often place programs in poorer and more flood prone areas, as well as in areas in which villagers have requested program services. Treating the timing and placement of programs as random can lead to serious mismeasurement of program effectiveness (Pitt, Rosenzweig and Gibbons (1993) ).
Consider the implications of a program allocation rule that was more likely to place credit programs in poorer villages than in richer ones. Comparison of the two set of villages as in a treatment/control framework would lead to a downward bias in the estimated effect of the program on household income and wealth (and other outcomes associated with income and wealth) and could even erroneously suggest that credit programs reduce income and wealth if the positive effect of the credit program on the difference between "treatment" and "control" villages did not exceed the negative village effect that induced the nonrandom placement.
2) Unmeasured village attributes affect both program credit demand and household outcomes y . Even if ij credit programs are randomly placed by the agencies involved, attributes of villages that are not well measured in the data may affect both the demand for program credit and the household Another measure of the "price of credit program participation" is some proxy for the information costs 3 associated with learning about these credit programs. To some extent, this depends on the qualities of the the credit program organizers and staff. Our survey collected information on the educational background, experience, age and gender of credit program organizers and other staff. There was a substantial number of missing values in these data and these measured attributes tended to vary little across the sample. In any case, the validity of these variables as instruments requires that the credit programs allocate program organizers randomly across villages, which is uncertain.
7
outcomes of interest. These attributes include prices, infrastructure, village attitudes and the nature of the environment including climate and propensity to natural disaster. For example, the proximity of villages to urban areas may influence the demand for credit to undertake small-scale activities but may also affect household behavior by altering attitudes.
3) Unmeasured household attributes affect both credit demand and household outcomes y . These ij attributes include endowments of innate health, ability, and fecundity, as well as preference heterogeneity. Consider the possibility that households are heterogeneous in their preferences with respect to the relative treatment of males and females within the household. It seems possible that households that are more egalitarian in their treatment of the sexes are more likely to provide additional resources to females, such as providing additional schooling to girls, and also more likely to have female household members participate in credit programs than otherwise identical but less egalitarian households. Ignoring this heterogeneity would wrongly ascribe to the credit program that part of the more egalitarian intra-household distribution of resources due to the more "egalitarian" preferences of households that self-select themselves into the program.
The standard approach to the problem of estimating equations with endogenous regressors, such as equation (2), is to use instrumental variables. In the model set out above, the exogenous regressors Z in ij equation (1) are the identifying instruments. Unfortunately, it is difficult to find any regressors Z that can ij justifiably be used as identifying instrumental variables. An approach motivated by demand theory is to use the price of the conditioned upon endogenous variable as an identifying instrument. The most obvious measure of the "price of credit program participation" is the interest rate charged, but this is ruled out here since it does not vary across the sample Even if interest rates varied across the sample, it is likely that some of this variation may reflect unmeasured household attributes unknown to us but known to the lender and likely to be part of the , error term, and hence be an invalid instrument.
y ,3 ij
Measured program credit is a limited dependent variable since not all eligible households participate in 4 the credit programs. Some of the household outcomes of interest --such as schooling of children and women's labor supply --are also limited dependent variables. As is well known, fixed effects estimation in this case generally yields inconsistent parameter estimates without large numbers of observations on each fixed effects unit. An exception is the fixed effects Tobit estimator of Honoré (1992) . Heckman (1981) provides Monte Carlo evidence that with 8 or more observations per fixed effects unit, the inconsistency problem becomes relatively inconsequential. The average number of target households per village in this study is 20.2. There are 87 village units in the data, 72 with credit programs, and joint estimation of credit use by gender (see below) with each household outcome (such as schooling or labor supply) implies that nearly 200 fixed effects parameters need to be jointly estimated. This is the standard sample selection framework of Heckman (1976) and Lee (1976) . If the errors are assumed to be normally distributed, as is common, the treatment effect is implicitly identified from the deviations from normality within the sample of treatment participants. The nonlinearity of the presumed distribution is crucial. If both the treatment and the outcome are measured as binary indicators, identification of the treatment effect is generally not possible even with the specification of an error distribution.
The reasonableness of the exogeneity of land ownership is discussed at length below. 
Implicit in this setup is the assumption that the effect of the treatment (*) is the same for all individuals, an 6 assumption which is common in the program evaluation literature (Moffitt 1991) . Furthermore, the model is not nonparametrically identified. That is, if the linear indices X ( and (X $+*I ) were replaced by nonparametric c y c
functions of the X's, and I the model is not identified. To ensure that the program effect estimated is not driven by c the linear relationship between land holdings and the outcome variable, we have estimated the model while allowing for land to enter as a quadratic and successively higher level polynomial. The program effect results reported below were not qualitatively altered by these changes.
where p is the proportion of landless households in village 2 who choose to participate in the program. It is clear that all the parameters, including the effect of the credit program *, is identified from this design.
To illustrate the log-likelihood maximized, consider the case of a binary treatment (I =1 if c treatment chosen, 0 otherwise) and a binary outcome (I =1 if outcome is true, 0 otherwise). This is the y most difficult model to identify in that nonlinearity arising from the choice of an error distribution is insufficient to identify the credit effect parameter *. In the estimation results reported below, the treatment is actually measured as cumulative borrowing of program credit. Distinguishing between households not having choice because they reside in a non-program village and households residing in a program village that do not have choice because of the application of an exogenous rule (landowning status), and suppressing the household and village subscripts i and j, the likelihood can be written as:
where M is the bivariate standard normal distribution, M is the univariate standard normal Underlying identification in this model is the assumption that land ownership is exogenous (as defined above) in this population. Although it is clearly nonstandard to use program eligibility criteria for purposes of identification in most instances of program evaluation, we think its use is well justified here.
Unlike the evaluation of job training programs, health/nutrition interventions, and many other types of programs, where lack of job skills, lack of health, or insufficiency in some other behavior are both criteria for eligibility and the behaviors the programs directly act upon, land ownership is used as the primary eligibility criteria for these credit programs only to proxy for unverifiable and difficult-to-measure indicators of income, consumption or total asset wealth. Land ownership is simple to quantify, well known within the community, and unlikely to change in the medium-term. Market turnover of land is well-known to be low in South Asia. The absence of an active land market is the rationale given for the treatment of land ownership as an exogenous regressor in almost all the empirical work on household behavior in South Asia. For example, in a classic paper in the field, Rosenzweig (1980) tested the implications of neoclassical theory for the labor market and other behaviors of farm households in India by splitting the sample on the basis of land ownership, treating the sample separation criterion as nonselective. A number of theories have been set forth to explain the infrequency of land sales. Binswanger and Rosenzweig (1986) analyze the set of material and behavioral factors which are important determinants of production
relations in land-scarce settings, and conclude that land sales would be few and limited mainly to distress sales, particularly where national credit markets are underdeveloped. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1985) set out an overlapping generations model incorporating returns to specific experience which has low land turnover as an implication and, using data from the Additional Rural Incomes Survey of the National
Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER) of India, find a very low incidence of land sales.
Even if land ownership is exogenous for the purposes of this analysis, it is necessary that the "landless" and the "landed" can be pooled in the estimation. In order to enhance the validity of this assumption, we restrict the set of nontarget households used in the estimation to those with less than 5 acres of owned land. In addition, we include the quantity of land owned as one of the regressors in the vector X ij and include a dummy variable indicating the target/nontarget status of the household. As the illustrative example of the identification strategy (equations (3) and (4) There are a very small number of individuals who belonged to credit programs that met in other villages. For 7 example, there are some women in the sample who belonged to Grameen Bank groups even though there was not a Grameen Bank group in their village. These participation decisions were treated as exogenous in the analysis.
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male cannot both participate. This rule seems to not be strictly enforced and there are a number of households in our sample in which both an adult male and adult female belonged to a credit group. As a consequence, we allow for a positive probability of participation for both men and women whenever the household is program eligible and women's and men's groups are in the village.
Introducing gender-specific credit is not a trivial generalization of the econometric model. While the likelihood given by (5) illustrates the general principal and method used, the actual likelihoods maximized are substantially more complex. Our method is a substantial generalization of the LIML likelihoods presented in Smith and Blundell (1986) and Rivers and Vuong (1988) for limited dependent variables The likelihoods may contain trivariate normal distribution functions because two credit equations (6) and (7) are being estimated simultaneously with a limited dependent variable outcome equation. In addition, the sample design is choice-based (see Section V below). In particular, program participants are purposely over-sampled. The use of choice-based sampling somewhat complicates the econometrics but allows researchers to get the most statistical efficiency per dollar spent on data collection (Lancaster and Imbens, 1991) . Not correcting for the choice-based nature of the sample would lead to biased parameter estimates. The Weighted Exogenous Sampling Maximum Likelihood (WESML) methods of Manski and Lerman (1977) were grafted onto the limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) methods described above in the estimation of both parameters and the parameter covariance matrix.
WESML estimates are obtained by maximizing a weighted log likelihood function with weights for each choice equal to the ratio of the population proportion to the sample proportion for that choice. The information required to construct these weights were directly measured in each of the surveyed villages.
Prior to drawing a sample of households, a census of every household in each of the 87 randomly drawn Table A2 presents summary statistics of the household-and individual-level outcomes that are examined in this paper disaggregated by various groups --participating and non-participating household in program areas, target households in non-program areas, and aggregates for all households in all areas. The survey design and data are described in greater detail in Pitt and Khandker (1995) .
VI. Results

A. Comparing Estimators
In this section we present and interpret the results of estimating conditional demand equations of the form given by equation (8) for a set of household behaviors. In addition to WESML-LIML-FE estimates using the quasi-experimental identification restrictions set out in Section IV above, we present alternative sets of estimates which do not fully treat credit program placement and participation as endogenous. These alternative estimates are presented to illustrate the importance of heterogeneity bias.
Three of the four alternative estimates ignore self-selection into credit programs; two of these three treat the choice-based sampling nature of the survey appropriately and use WESML methods, while the
Furthermore, neither naive model deals with the possible non-independence of the errors arising from multiple 8 seasonal observations on some household behaviors (consumption and labor supply) or observations on more than one member of a household for other behaviors (schooling). This is not atypical of much of the applied literature in this area. If the exogeneity assumption is valid, ignoring non-independence provides consistent parameter estimates but inconsistent estimates of the parameter covariance matrix. In the case of WESML-LIML, WESML-LIML-FE, and WESML-FE estimation, the parameter covariance matrices are computed using an asymptotic bootstrap method, essentially a variant of White's (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance estimator, to correct for the effects of non-independent errors. The formula for this covariance matrix is presented in equation (A12) of the appendix. Appendix Table A1 ), as is common in this type of cross-sectional analysis.
The third alternative estimator, labeled WESML-LIML, treats credit program participation as endogenous but also treats program placement as random, and thus does not include village fixed effects.
If the latter assumption is true, the WESML-LIML estimates are consistent and efficient, and the WESML-LIML-FE estimates are consistent but inefficient. If program placement is nonrandom, the WESML-LIML estimates are inconsistent. Hausman-like tests of the consistency of the WESML-LIML models were attempted but the covariance matrices of the differences in the parameter vectors were not positive definite in every case tried. The test statistic computed is:
where $ and $ (E and E) refer to the WESML-LIML-FE and WESML-LIML parameter vectors FE FE (covariance matrices) respectively. Typically, the problem is that one or more of the diagonal elements of the covariance matrix (E -E) are very close to zero, and sometimes negative. This problem is not FE uncommon in estimation problems of this kind. As the source of potential bias in the WESML-LIML estimates is correlation between village fixed effects and the regressors, we check for the presence of such correlation by regressing the estimated village fixed effects on the full set of regressors in each of the WESML-LIML-FE models. This approach resembles that of Chamberlain (1984) to the specification of panel data models in which the fixed effects are explicitly modeled as linear functions of the regressors
The test statistics are F(14,1242)=1.82 and F(14,967)=11.21 for female and male credit, respectively.
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The fixed effects are those from the model, presented in Table 1 , in which only the reduced form determinants of credit by gender are estimated with WESML bivariate Tobit fixed effects. To control for the possibility that the residuals of the regressions of fixed effects on the regressor may not be independent within a village, the parameter covariance matrix used in computing the test statistics is a variant of White's (1990) heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance estimator adjusted for village-specific random effects (Appendix equation (A12)).
These second-stage regressions of estimated village fixed effects are available from the authors upon 10 request.
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except that we directly estimate the incidental parameters and use the second-stage regression of the estimated fixed effects on the regressors to establish that the fixed effects and the regressors are correlated.
The estimated village fixed effects associated with female credit program participation, the µ from c jf equation (6), and the estimated village fixed effects associated with male credit program participation, the µ from equation (7), are significantly (at the 0.05 level) correlated with the regressors X . These fixed c 9 jm ij effects parameters are repeatedly estimated in each model of behavior (labor supply, assets, schooling, expenditure) presented below, since the determinants of credit program participation, as measured by borrowing, are estimated jointly with each behavior in the maximum likelihood procedure, and thus this correlation between µ and the observed determinants of credit characterizes all of the behavioral models.
c ij
Regressions of the estimated fixed effects parameters associated with each (noncredit) behavior, the µ , on y j the set of regressors affecting behavior, X and the C and C , reveal these estimated fixed effects are ij ijf ijm correlated with the regressors in 3 of 6 cases (household expenditure, women's nonland assets and girl's schooling) at the 0.05 level.
B. Village Externalities and the Interpretation of Village Fixed Effects
One important drawback of estimating program impacts from data on two cohorts --those from villages with and without programs available --in which assignment to cohorts is nonrandom, that is, program placement is deliberate rather than random, is the possible misinterpretation of the village fixed effects. The discussion so far has treated the village-effects as time invariant attributes. But it is possible that credit programs can alter village attitudes and other village characteristics, perhaps through demonstration or spillover effects, and thus the attitudes of those who do not participate in the credit programs as well as those that do. The full effect of the program on behavior must then include any such village "externalities" and not just the direct effect on credit participants.
As an example, consider the limiting case in which program placement is in fact random but that program activities, particularly those aimed at altering attitudes, successfully alter the views of 
C. Demand for Credit
The results of estimating the credit equations (6) and (7), which are estimated jointly with the conditional demand equation (8) in every case that LIML is applied, is presented in Table 1 . Since there are no endogenous right-hand-side regressors in the credit equations, they can be estimated separately from the conditional demand equations using WESML bivariate tobit with village fixed effects. Implicit in these estimates is a set of restrictions on the parameters $ and $ of equations (6) and (7). In particular, the cf cm determinants of women's (men's) credit participation (the $'s) are presumed to not depend on whether men
The idea is that there may be two regimes each with different parameter vectors for each sex: a regime 11 in which a sex is the only one able to choose to participate in a credit program and a regime in which both sexes can participate.
The variables "No adult females in household" and "No adult males in household" were included as 12 regressors because the adult education variables "Highest grade completed by an adult female in household" and "Highest grade completed by an adult male in household" are undefined when there are no adults (defined as a household member 16 years of age or older) of that sex in the household. Whenever there was no adult member of one sex in the household, the relevant "Highest grade completed..." variable was coded zero. The "No adult..." variable thus picks up the difference between having zero as the highest number of years of schooling of adults of a particular sex and not having any adult of that sex in the household.
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(women) also have a choice of joining the credit program. This restriction was tested and could not be 11 rejected at common levels of significance (P (28)=22.6, p=0.25). Note that this does not necessarily imply 2 that the presence or absence of a credit program for the opposite sex does not matter, only that it does not affect the slope parameters ($). The "demand" curve may be shifted up or down but such shifts are not statistically identifiable in this model as they are fully captured by the village specific intercepts µ . The c ij other restriction is that the slope parameters $ are common for the three credit programs. Again, the credit equations may be shifted up or down but such shifts are not statistically identifiable in this model as they are fully captured by the village specific intercepts µ .
The set of variables describing the availability of potential sources of intra-family transfers were not significant determinants of credit demand for either gender. The age and sex of household head are apparently important determinants of credit demand for both women and men, but of opposite signs as between the sexes. Having a male head reduces the expected level of credit received by an eligible (as opposed to participating) woman by 47 percent and increases the expected level of credit received by an eligible male by 33 percent. Increases in the age of the head of household by 10 years are associated with a 5 percent increase in expected credit for women but a 5 percent decrease in expected credit for men.
Having no spouse present in the household reduces expected credit for women by 23 percent and for men by 24 percent. Program credit is increasing with area of land owned for men but not different from zero for women. A test of the hypothesis that the slope parameters in women's and men's credit demand are equal is strongly rejected (P (14)=50.94, p=0.00), reflecting to a large extent the opposite and significant sex and 2 age of household head effects, as well as the land effect.
D. Household Expenditure and Women's Assets
Although the magnitude of these differences is large, the set of female credit parameters is not 13 significantly different from the male credit parameters (P²(3)=3.39).
20 Table 2 presents estimates of the impact of credit program participation on the natural logarithm of total weekly expenditure per capita using all three rounds of survey data. All three WESML-LIML-FE female credit parameters are positive and statistically significant determinants of total expenditure, with no t-statistic less than 3.8, and are jointly significant (P (3)=19.03, p=0.00). In contrast, none of the male 2 credit parameters has a t-statistic over 2.0 and the hypothesis that all the male credit parameters are zero cannot be rejected at the 0.05 level of significance (P (3)=4.11, p=0.25). The estimated female credit effects 2 are approximately double the male credit parameters for the same credit program. There are not 13 substantially different effects among the three credit programs. At the mean, an additional one taka of credit provided women adds 0.18 taka to total annual household expenditure, as compared with 0.11 taka if the same amount of additional credit is supplied to men. The discussion is Section II suggests one reason for the difference in the point estimates is the greater production inefficiency associated with women's time as a result of an absent women's wage labor market that is averted by access to credit.
The WESML-LIML parameter estimates of the determinants of (log) total expenditure in Table 2 demonstrate the importance of the village fixed effects in the estimation. Women's credit effects are underestimated by WESML-LIML, and all three male credit parameters are negative and two (BRAC and Without conditioning on village of residence, the WESML-LIML D's suggests that the men of richer (higher expenditure) households are more likely to join but the women of poorer (lower expenditure) households are more likely to join. Table 2 also presents estimates of the determinants of the value of nonland asset holdings by women. The asset variables are sex-specific rather than individual-specific in that they are defined as the total value of assets held by all individuals of each sex in the household. Thus, no household contributes more than one observation to each of the sex-specific asset equations estimated. In addition, the mandatory
The quality of asset data is typically suspect in household surveys, even more so when there is an 14 attempt to break assets down by sex of ownership. The relative variance of the asset data is very high (see Table  A2 ), with many household reporting zero for women's assets. The male asset data was even more troublesome. We were unable to get any of the log-likelihoods for the determinants of male asset's to converge.
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savings component of these credit programs is not included in calculation of nonland assets. A test of exogeneity, a test that the two D's are jointly zero, in the determination of the nonland asset holds of women could not be rejected (P²(2)=1.76) and thus exogeneity is imposed in the WESML-FE estimates. The WESML-FE estimates find that credit program participation by women increase the value of their nonland asset holdings, while male participation does not. For women at the mean, every 100 taka of increased credit from BRAC, BRDB and Grameen Bank increases the value of their nonland assets by 15, 29 and 27 taka, respectively. Women's nonland assets seems to be the behavior for which the difference between the unweighted and weighted naive estimates is the greatest amongst those studied, that is, the choice-based nature of the sample matters most. 14 E. Labor Supply Table 3 presents alternative estimates of the impact of program credit on market labor supply including self-employment (log hours in the past week) by gender using all three seasonal rounds of the survey. The naive estimates substantially overestimate the effect of credit provided women on their labor supply. The exogeneity hypothesis cannot be rejected for women's labor supply (P²(2)=1.53) and so exogeneity is imposed in the WESML-FE estimates. These estimates demonstrate a statistically significant positive effect of women's participation in the Grameen Bank on women's labor supply, and the marginal significance of the women's BRAC and BRDB parameters. As both labor supply and credit are in natural logarithms, the credit parameters are the elasticities of (latent) hours of market labor supply with respect to credit. These elasticities are not large. Although statistically significant as a set, the largest of these labor supply elasticities, with respect to credit from the Grameen Bank, is only 0.104. In light of the relatively large elasticities of per capita household expenditure with respect to women's credit of around 0.4, it would seem that group-based credit provided women benefits household consumption presumably by increasing the productivity of women's market time rather than by increasing the supply of that time.
The conclusion that it is not an increase in market labor supply that underlies the increase in household consumption is reinforced by the male labor supply results. Both male credit (P²(3)=98.66, p=0.00) and female credit (P²(3)=53.11, p=0.00) reduce the labor time of adult male household members.
A 10 percent increase in male group-based credit is associated with about a 1.4 percent decline in labor 22 supply and a 10 percent increase in female group-based credit is associated with about a 2.1 percent decline in labor supply. As it seems unlikely that they are substituting home time for market time, the only conclusion to be drawn is that these negative cross-effects reflect income effects. If the market value of men's time is unchanged by women's borrowing, their labor supply should fall if male leisure is a normal good. This is consistent with a variety of scenario's. One of which is that men already have ready access to non-program credit markets, so that program credit provides men mostly with rents proportional to the difference between the program and next-best-alternative rates of interest. When this result was presented to those who manage and work in these credit programs in Bangladesh, they stated that it is consistent with their personal observation that the provision of credit from their programs tended to reduce men's labor supply. These labor supply results suggest that one other reason the effect of program credit on total household expenditure on goods is higher for women than men is the increased consumption of leisure associated with male borrowing. Table 4 presents estimates of the effects of credit program participation on the school enrollment status of boy and girl children aged 5-17 at the time of the survey. In both cases, the exogeneity hypothesis could not be rejected and so we will reference only the WESML-FE estimates. These estimates demonstrate a strong and statistically significant effect of female Grameen Bank credit on the schooling of girl's (t=2.92).
F. Schooling of Children
A one percent increase in Grameen Bank credit provided women is predicted to increase the probability of girl's school enrollment by 1.86 percent points, at the mean. No other credit parameters are statistically significant. The relatively smaller effect of women's credit on their daughters' schooling for the other credit programs may reflect the close substitution of women and girls time in both the production of household goods and in the self-employment activity. If mother's are drawn into self-employment, daughter's time may be used to replace the time mother's withdraw from household production (such child care and food preparation). Although the Grameen Bank emphasizes the schooling of daughters as part of its social development program, there is no way to ascribe the higher girl's schooling effect to this attribute of its program.
The WESML-FE estimates of the determinants of boy's schooling presented in Table 4 demonstrate a significant positive effect of women's credit from both Grameen and BRDB on boy's current schooling.
Both the set of women's and men's credit variable are statistically significant determinants of boy's schooling (P²(3)=22.21 and P²(3)=9.49, respectively). A one percent increase in Grameen Bank credit provided women and men increases the probability of boy's school enrollment by 2.4 and 2.8 percentage points, respectively. A one percent increase in credit to women from the BRDB has the largest impact on boy's school enrollment, 3.1 percentage points. Unlike girls, boys are likely to be poor substitutes for women/girl's time, they are less likely to be drawn into the self-employment activity or into the production of household goods as a result of credit provided adult women.
VII. Summary
Group-based lending programs for the poor have become a focus of attention in the development community over the last several years. To date, there has been no comprehensive investigation of their impact on household behavior that has been sufficiently attentive to issues of endogeneity and self-selection.
In addition, there is little evidence on whether production credit provided women has a different effect on household outcomes than production credit provided men. Evidence of such a difference is consistent with imperfect household fungibility.
Using data from a special survey carried out in 87 rural Bangladeshi villages during 1991-1992, this paper estimates the impact of female and male participation in group-based credit programs on a set of behaviors while paying close attention to issues of endogeneity. It uses the quasi-experimental design of the survey and the credit programs to identify the effects of program credit by gender of participant in a limited information maximum likelihood framework. In order to demonstrate the importance of unobserved heterogeneity, the paper presents alternative estimates of the programs' impact on a variety of household and individual behaviors using simpler approaches which do not control for varying levels of endogeneity. A comparison of our econometric method with the simpler alternative approaches clearly indicates the importance of our attentiveness to endogeneity in evaluating these credit programs and the mistaken conclusions that could be drawn from the simple "naive" estimates.
The paper provides separate estimates of the influence of borrowing by both men and women for each of three credit programs (the Grameen Bank, the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), and the Bangladesh Rural Development Board's RD-12 program (BRDB)) on household expenditure, nonland assets held by women, male and female labor supply and boy's and girl's schooling. Table 5 summarizes a set of joint hypothesis tests. We find that credit is a significant determinant of many of these outcomes. Furthermore, credit provided to women was more likely to influence these behaviors than credit provided to men. Credit provided women significantly affects all 6 of the behaviors studied at the 0.05 level of significance. Credit provided men does so in only 1 of 6 cases. Annual household consumption 24 expenditure, the most comprehensive measure available of program impact, increased 18 taka for every 100 additional taka borrowed by women from these credit program, compared with 11 taka for men. This evidence suggests that credit is not perfectly fungible within the household. While the point estimates by gender often greatly differ, statistical tests presented in Table 5 reject the equality of men's and women's credit effects only in two cases, women's labor supply and women's nonland assets. male cannot both participate, this rule seems to not be strictly enforced and there are a number of households in our sample in which both an adult male and adult female from the same household belonged to a credit group. As a consequence, we allow for a positive probability of participation for both men and women in every household. The error vector {, , , , , } is assumed to be distributed as joint normal with zero means and covariance matrix 
The likelihood detailed below can be readily altered to handle the case of a strictly continuous or censored a (Tobit-like) behavior Y . The logarithm of per capita household expenditure is a strictly continuous outcome, labor ij supply and the value of nonland assets are censored, and boy's and girl's current school enrollment are discrete in our data.
(A6) (A7) (A8) (A9)
F is the variance of , , and G is a vector of covariances between the credit errors , and , , and , . The .
The quasi-experimental identification strategy used here is an example of the regression discontinuity b design method of program evaluation in that it takes advantage of a discontinuity in the program eligibility rule to identify the program treatment effect (van der Klauuw, 1997). Two-stage instrumental variable estimation of a model of this type can be accomplished by treating village dummy variables and a dummy variable for program eligibility interacted with all the exogenous variables as identifying instruments. The idea is that these exogenous variables have an effect on credit demand that depends on eligibility and availability but that the outcomes of interest are not discontinuously affected by the exogenous regressors conditional on credit program participation.
(A10)
where Every sampled household contributes to one of the eight mutually exclusive and exhaustive parts of the likelihood. The complete WESML log-likelihood L(2), where 2 is the complete set of unknown parameters, is the weighted sum of the individual household log-densities where the weight, w , for ij household i in village j is the ratio of the population proportion to the sample proportion for each of the eight groups in the household's village :
where L (2) is the log-density of household i in village j and corresponds to one of the eight parts of the ij log-likelihood described above. The parameter covariance matrix is computed as
The above formula is slightly altered when data on behavior Y are available from multiple ij individuals in the same household, as in the case of girl's and boy's schooling, or when data are available from all three rounds of the survey, as in the case of labor supply and household consumption. Adding a third subscript k to index an individual within a household or a round (time period) for a household, the possibility of nonindependent residuals for all values of k for household i in village j is addressed in the estimation of the parameter covariance matrix by using the sum of the scores over all values of k for each household in calculating the covariance matrix of the first derivative vector:
